Introduction
The Asian financial or economic crisis that started in July 1997 in Thailand has had a widespread impact on the economic growth, development and political stability of the major countries in Asia. The contagion of the crisis with damaging consequences has also spread to a lesser extent to the countries beyond Asia such as the USSR, Latin and North Americas and the European Union. The economic and political impact of the crisis is serious in the sense that it has retarded decades-long growth and development in the once 'miracle economies' in Asia and destroyed a number of governments in it in the process. But at the same time, this impact may not be that serious if it does not adversely affect the social fabrics or the well-being of the ordinary people of these countries.
The social or human impact of the Asian crisis has however not been adequately investigated and reported by experts from either academia or international organizations. This is unfortunate as it has been widely recognized that this kind of impact is probably the most profound and with severe consequences in the case of Indonesia, a major ASEAN (Association of the South-East Asian Nations) country with a population of 210 m people and strategically situated in one of the busiest sea-routes in the world.
This chapter focuses on this human dimension of the Asia crisis in Indonesia, analyses its various aspects and explores its possible remedies.
Almost two years after the start of the Asian financial crisis in the country, Indonesia was still paralysed by it on many fronts, despite the numerous rescue packages put up by the international organizations (e.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB)) and the various reforms introduced successively by the government. In 1998, the country's growth rate was -13.7 per cent. Even during the general election of June 1999, it was widely speculated by the international community that a change of government and the ruling party might not significantly change the inherent problems facing Indonesia.
A report released in June 1999 (Dabkowski, 1999) indicated that the country would need US$87 billion to rescue even the banking sector alone. At the same time, the Ministry of Investment released figures showing that, in the first four-and-a-half months of 1999, approved foreign investment into Indonesia fell 75 per cent to US$1.52 billion, as compared to that in the same period in 1998. Since foreign investment plays a crucial role in growth and development of a developing country, the downsize indicates the size and severity of the task confronting the government in its effort to reverse or even to halt the trend of foreign investors turning their back on Indonesia. The trend had been worsened since 1997. In fact, in 1998 approved foreign investment stood at US$13.6 billion as compared to US$22.1 billion in 1997.
In early 1999 international financial institutions and agencies had early also issued warnings about the long-term impact of the Asia crisis on Indonesia. The ratings agency Standard & Poors, for example, issued its own assessment of Indonesia's banking system and suggested that the problem is more fundamental than most analysts had envisaged and that it might take up to 10 years for the country to correct it. To support its argument, the agency cited the amount of money required to recapitalise banks and pay out creditors as being 24 per cent higher than the government's estimate. This amount was US$87 billion and placed the cost of resolving Indonesia's banking crisis among the highest of financial crises in the world in the past two decades. The cost increases with the time it takes to fix the crisis (Dabkowski, 1999) , due partly to the user's increasing costs of capital or loans.
What were the causes of Indonesia's banking problems in 1999? It has been suggested that it was a combination of issues: the crippling
